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Abstract—Peer-to-peer interactions between small-scale energy
resources exploit distribution network infrastructure as an elec-
tricity carrier, but remain financially unaccountable to electric
power utilities. This status-quo raises multiple challenges. First,
peer-to-peer energy trading reduces the portion of electricity
supplied to end-customers by utilities and their revenue streams.
Second, utilities must ensure that peer-to-peer transactions com-
ply with distribution network limits. This paper proposes a
peer-to-peer energy trading architecture, in two configurations,
that couples peer-to-peer interactions and distribution network
operations. The first configuration assumes that these interactions
are settled by the utility in a centralized manner, while the
second one is peer-centric and does not involve the utility.
Both configurations use distribution locational marginal prices
to compute network usage charges that peers must pay to the
utility for using the distribution network.
Index Terms—Peer-to-peer trading, prosumers, utility business
model, network usage charge.
NOMENCLATURE
A. Sets and Indices
b ∈ B Set of buses
l ∈ L Set of distribution lines
n ∈ N Sets of peers where N b/s denote sets of
buying/selling peers, N b∪N s =N
ω ∈ Ω Set of peer trades
ω ∈ Ωn Sets of trades of peer n,
⋃
n∈N Ωn = Ω
ω ∈ Ω∗ Set of the matched peer trades, Ω∗ ⊆ Ω
Λω={ρbω, ρsω} Set of buying/selling prices of trade ω
b(ω)/s(ω) Indices of buying/selling peers in trade ω
o(l)/r(l) Indices of originating/receiving-end nodes
of distribution line l
B. Parameters
Bb Susceptance of bus b [p.u.]
Cn(·) Cost function of selling peer n [$/MWh]
Cub Cost of utility generator at bus b [$/MWh]
Cw Wholesale market electricity price [$/MWh]
Dpb /D
q
b Active/reactive power demand [MW/MVAr]
Dpn/D
p
n Minimum/maximum power bought by peer n [MW]
Gb Conductance of bus b [p.u.]
Gpn/G
p
n Minimum/maximum power sold by peer n [MW]
P Standard trade size [MW]
P gb/P
g
b Minimum/maximum real power output limit of
utility generator at bus b [MW]
Qg
b
/Q
g
b Minimum/maximum reactive power output limit
of utility generator at bus b [MVAr]
Rl Resistance of distribution line l [p.u.]
Sl Apparent flow limit of distribution line l [MVA]
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Tb Electricity tariff at bus b [$/MWh]
Un(·) Utility function of buying peer n [$/MWh]
V b/V b Minimum/maximum limit on the squared voltage
magnitude at bus b [p.u.]
Xl Reactance of distribution line l [p.u.]
Γb Penetration level of the peer trading at bus b
Πu Revenue of the power utility [$]
Υn Value of electricity surplus for peer n [$/MW]
∆ρ Value of adjustment in price [$/MWh]
C. Variables
al Squared current flow of distribution line l [p.u.]
cnω Network usage charge for trade ω [$/MWh]
dpn Power bought by peer n [MW]
fpl /f
q
l Active/reactive power flow of distribution line l
[MW/MVAr]
gpn Power sold by peer n [MW]
pgb/q
g
b Active/reactive power output of utility generator
at bus b [MW/MVAr]
pω Power transfer from s(ω) to b(ω) in trade ω [MW]
vb Squared nodal voltage magnitude of bus b [p.u.]
η+l /η
−
l Dual variable of forward/backward flow limit con-
straints on distribution line l
λb Dual variable of the active power balance con-
straint at bus b
µb Dual variable of the reactive power balance con-
straint at bus b
ρbω/ρ
s
ω Buying/selling price of trade ω [$/MWh]
I. INTRODUCTION
Owing to recent advances in smart grid technologies, the
U.S. power grid is undergoing nation-wide modernization. One
of the most important objectives of this modernization is to
achieve a high degree of supply autonomy of electricity con-
sumers from their local electric power utility and the freedom
to choose their electricity suppliers. In practice, the supply
autonomy and the freedom to choose are enabled by rolling
out customer-end distributed energy resources (DERs), which
include, but are not limited to, photovoltaic panels, battery
energy storage, and demand-side management. If these DERs
are appropriately sized and operated, electricity consumers are
shown to significantly reduce, if not completely eliminate,
their dependency on the electricity supply from the utility.
While the roll-out of DERs offers significant reliability
and economic benefits to both the utility and consumers,
it reduces revenue streams of the utility and undermines
their financial viability. Furthermore, accommodating large-
scale DER deployment also imposes technical challenges on
the distribution network operations since the current electric
power distribution infrastructure was not designed to deal
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2with bidirectional power flows, increased voltage fluctuations
and volatile nodal power injections induced by DERs. As a
response to these challenges, utilities in many U.S. regions
have already started increasing electricity tariffs, thus further
incentivizing remaining consumers to adopt DERs and ex-
acerbating their impact on the distribution system [1]. This
self-fueling process – colloquially known as the utility’s death
spiral – calls for urgent changes to the current electric power
distribution practice. Accordingly, 94% of the senior power
and the utility executives surveyed by PricewaterhouseCoopers
predict ‘complete transformation [...] to the power utility
business model’ by 2030, [2].
These techno-economic challenges observed by utilities mo-
tivate to re-think and re-engineer interactions between stand-
alone DERs and utilities to continue harvesting their benefits
without compromising supply reliability. Among possible al-
ternatives, the peer-to-peer (P2P) architecture is regarded as
a viable coordination mechanism that can efficiently operate
heterogeneous DERs, [3], while respecting physical limits
on the distribution network. The P2P architecture assumes
a less centralized, more autonomous and flexible electricity
delivery, in which small-scale (e.g. residential and commercial)
producers and consumers can transact electricity and other
services as an alternative to centralized electricity supply from
utilities or third-party aggregators.
Unlike the current distribution practice that mainly pursues
the economies of scale and scope benefits [4], the value
proposition of the P2P architecture stems from the sharing
economy [5]. The sharing economy monetizes under-utilized
or otherwise suboptimally used resources due to the failure of
utilities and aggregators to effectively communicate with and
aggregate DERs, [4], [6]. However, the current regulatory en-
vironment does not incentivize power utilities to accommodate
P2P, thus hindering their value to the system [4], [7].
The literature on P2P interactions in distribution systems
is thin and still emerging. Morstyn et al. [8]–[10] leverage
the concept of full substitutability [11], i.e. an equilibrium
condition for peers in a hierarchical supply chain, to develop
a bilateral contract network for P2P energy trading. This
contract network allows for forward (e.g. day-ahead) and
real-time energy trading that produce a time-static, network-
unconstrained stable equilibrium that peers have no incentive
to deviate from. Park et al. [12] derived a closed form
of network-unconstrained Nash equilibrium among peers in
microgrids and Tushar et al. [13] review game- and auction-
theoretic approaches to represent the P2P interactions under
different implementation scenarios. Relative to [11], [12], the
authors of [13] generalize the definition of the P2P equilibrium
in the network-constrained context. While [13] emphasizes the
importance of accounting for network constraints in P2P trans-
actions, it does not describe how it can be done. To account
for possible network limitations, Ahn et al. [14] restrict P2P
interactions to neighboring nodes and exploit the Lagrangian
duality to compute the electricity and “energy flow” prices.
The latter price is used to charge peers for using the network
infrastructure operated by utilities, but does not capture the
effect of P2P interactions in other (more remote) distribution
grid locations. This limitation is partly addressed by Baroche
et al. [15], where the authors consider P2P energy transactions
across a given network and account for basic power flow
constraints via the DC power flow approximation. The model
in [15] can also enforce a fixed, exogenous charge on peers for
using the utility’s network infrastructure. However, the use of
the DC approximation does not reflect the distribution network
physics (e.g. losses, voltage regulation, reactive power support)
and, thus, the actual cost incurred by the utility. Furthermore,
exogenously set charges in [15] do not capture spatio-temporal
dynamics of the distribution system and sensitivities of peers.
Mu¨nsing et al. [16] present a blockchain-enabled decentralized
P2P market-clearing algorithm using a convexified AC opti-
mal power flow (OPF) and exploit the distribution locational
marginal prices (DLMPs) to settle transactions among peers.
Building on [16], Wang et al. [17], [18] leverage blockchains
to design a “Crowdsourced energy system” with a P2P energy
trading for day-ahead and real-time operations. Although [16]–
[18] incentivize P2P interactions, they do not compensate the
power utilities for peers’ usage of the distribution network.
The P2P matching mechanisms, i.e. methods to connect
peering producers and consumers, can be classified as either
system-centric [13]–[18] or peer-centric [8]–[10], [12]. The
system-centric matching resembles pool-structured wholesale
electricity markets with the single supervisory entity that
collects and matches the bids and offers submitted by market
participants in a centralized manner. On the other hand, the
peer-centric approach is decentralized, which offers more flex-
ibility for accommodating their preferences, [11], and allows
for distributed decision-making protocols that preserve privacy
of peers, [19], [20]. Regardless of the matching mechanism
chosen, the large-scale implementation of P2P interactions
is expected to affect the ability of the utility to operate the
distribution network efficiently and reliably.
This paper aims to design a new electric power distribution
architecture that will allow for a large volume of P2P interac-
tions among small-scale DERs and shift electric power utilities
from the current volumetric business model, when the revenue
is proportional to the amount of electricity sold to customers,
to a service-based business model, where the revenue is
collected from providing services to support electricity trading
by other parties. To this end, we conceptualize the P2P
platform 1, i.e. a marketplace for direct energy transactions
among peers, that can internalize both the system- and peer-
centric matching approaches. To effectively accommodate P2P
in the distribution system, the P2P platform is then integrated
with a distribution AC OPF. This integration aims to capture
the sharing economy benefits, without compromising supply
reliability, and ensures that P2P interactions are accounted for
in OPF-based energy management tools. Unlike [16]–[18], this
paper uses the OPF framework to derive and compute network
usage charges to be paid by peers for using the distribution
network based on the DLMPs, [21]. The use of the DLMPs
makes it possible to represent spatio-temporal dimensions of
operating conditions in the distribution network and consider
them while computing the network usage charges. In turn, the
1 Our definition of the P2P platform is technology agnostic, e.g. it can
be enabled by either blockchains [12], [16]–[18] or other decentralized
technologies.
3network usage charges are then used to encourage those P2P
transactions that improve the overall distribution system per-
formance and generate an additional revenue stream intended
to offset the drop in the utility’s revenue caused by the roll-out
of customer-end DERs.
II. DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM WITH THE P2P PLATFORM
Regardless of the peer matching mechanism chosen, it is
important to consider generic interfaces that relates the P2P
platform and the rest of the distribution system. Fig. 1 illus-
trates these interfaces for different volumes of the electricity
supplied by the P2P platform as compared to the current
distribution system architecture.
A. Current distribution system architecture
The current distribution system architecture is shown in
Fig. 1(a), where the sole utility operates the distribution
network, supplies electricity to customers and collects the
electricity payment. Under this practice, the electricity prices
for small-scale consumers are based on flat or time-of-use
volumetric electricity rates, which are typically regulated and
set to recover both the operating and capital costs incurred
by the utility. The operating cost includes the cost of elec-
tricity supply, maintenance, network losses and control, while
the capital cost includes the cost of expansion and upgrade
projects. In this case, the revenue of the utility is:
Πu =
∑
b∈B
TbD
p
b , (1)
and is proportional to rate Tb and active power demand D
p
b ,
thus assuming all operating and capital costs are uniformly
allocated among customers based on their electricity con-
sumption. However, this approach fails to adequately capture
the costs incurred by the customers that deployed their own
DERs, which reduce or eliminate their electricity consumption
provided by the utility and thus the utility revenue. Since rate
Tb lumps together different operating and capital costs, it is
impossible to accurately itemize the effect of DERs on the
operating cost. Therefore, the current practice impedes further
proliferation of DERs because it does not provide sufficient
compensation for network services provided by the utility.
While the time-of-use rates recognize temporal (e.g. intra-
day) fluctuations of electricity demand, their temporal granu-
larity is fairly coarse and usually is limited to two intra-day
internvals (e.g., peak and off-peak rate). Furthermore, their
spatial granularity does not recognize network peculiarities
of electric power distribution systems and is typically set on
municipality boundaries. As an attempt to increase spatio-
temporal granularity of tariffs, Caramanis et al. [22] proposed
to introduce DLMPs that would internalize these network
peculiarities and dynamically changing demand conditions in
the price formation process (similarly to wholesale locational
marginal prices), thus improving pricing fidelity. The DLMPs
have been shown to accurately reflect the physics of AC power
flows in distribution systems, [21], and can be extended to
accommodate uncertain nodal injections, [23]. However, in
practice, DLMPs have not been implemented yet, in part due to
Utility Utility
Network 
Usage
Charge
(a) (b) (c)
Distribution 
Network
Utility
P2P Platform P2P Platform
Customers 
served by 
the utility
Network
Dispatch
Network 
Dispatch
Electricity 
Payment
Network 
Usage
Charge
Electricity 
Payment
Distribution 
Network
Network 
Dispatch
Customers 
served by 
the utility
Distribution 
Network
Fig. 1: Comparison of the distribution system architecture with and
without the proposed P2P platform: (a) Current architecture, (b)
Mixed architecture, (c) P2P architecture. Solid and dashed arrows
represent energy and financial flows respectively.
lacking advanced metering infrastructure and socio-economic
implications that granular electricity prices may cause, [24].
B. Distribution system architecture with the P2P platform
Based on the open access assumption, we envision two
possible distribution architectures that can replace the current
architecture in Fig. 1(a). The mixed architecture illustrated in
Fig. 1(b) preserves the current option of receiving electricity
supply from the utility for some consumers and also enables
the P2P interactions among stand-alone DERs and consumers.
Under the mixed architecture, the P2P platform matches
producing and consuming peers and sets the electricity price
for them. Since the P2P transactions will rely on the utility to
operate the network, the peers are also additionally charged
by the utility for using the network infrastructure. Therefore,
the utility revenue is given as follows:
Πu =
∑
b∈B
TbD
p
b (1−Γb)+NUC(cnω, pω), (2)
where the first term represents the electricity payment from the
customers that receive their electricity supply directly from
the utility and NUC(·) is the total network usage charges
collected by the utility from the peers participating in the P2P
interactions. In Eq. (2), parameter Γb ∈ [0, 1] defines the ratio
between the total demand of a peer located at bus b served by
the utility and by the P2P platform. Thus, the total demand
procured by the P2P platform is
∑
ω∈Ω∗ pω =
∑
b∈BD
p
bΓb.
The P2P architecture in Fig. 1(c) represents a particular case
of the mixed architecture in Fig. 1(b), where the utility does
not supply electricity and only supports network operations
and the P2P platform satisfies the demand of all customers. In
this case the utility revenue can be obtained by setting Γb = 1:
Πu = NUC(cnω, pω). (3)
The key component of both the mixed and P2P architectures
described above is network usage charge NUC(cnω, pω) that
needs to be designed to recover the cost incurred by the utility
while operating the distribution network and factored in the
price formation process within the P2P platform. Similarly to
the DLMPs, the network usage charge in Eq. (3) is computed
based on operating conditions and does not aim to recover
capital (long-term) costs.
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Fig. 2: A schematic representation of the peer matching process
as (a) a simple bipartite graph for the system-centric configuration
and (b) a bipartite graph with parallel edges for the peer-centric
configuration. The edge represents trade ω of power pω between
seller s(ω) and consumer b(ω).
III. P2P TRADING WITH NETWORK USAGE CHARGE
Implementing the P2P architecture, as shown in Fig. 1(b)-
(c), requires routines to enable the peer matching process
and to couple the P2P interactions with distribution network
operations. Section III-A describes two distinct peer-matching
routines, while Sections III-B and III-C introduce network
usage charges to integrate these routines in one decision-
making process with distribution network operations.
A. Peer matching process
We develop the peer-matching routines for two possible con-
figurations that may arise in the future. The first configuration,
referred to as system-centric, assumes that the utility will be
responsible for matching the peers in a welfare-maximizing
manner. By contrast, the peer-centric routine is carried out
autonomously from the utility and is driven by preferences and
choices of the peers. For the sake of modeling convenience,
both the system- and peer-centric configurations described
below assume that each peer can be either a producer, or a
consumer, or an idler at a given time instance. This role assign-
ment can also change at different time instances. For example,
if a peer is equipped with an energy storage unit, it can act as a
producer, when it discharges power to the distribution system,
and as a consumer, when it charges power from the distribution
system. Also, there are no exogenous restrictions on the set of
possible matches between the consuming and producing peers.
Under these two assumptions, the peer matching process in
both configurations can be represented as a bipartite graph in
Fig. 2. Each P2P energy trade ω is represented as an edge with
sending and receiving nodes n ∈ N s and m ∈ N b, respec-
tively. We also denote node n of edge ω as seller s(ω) = n
and node m as buyer b(ω) = m for every trade ω with the
traded power denoted as pω . The system-centric configuration
is represented as a simple (trivial) bipartite graph in Fig. 2(a),
i.e. there is only one edge (trade) connecting a buying and a
selling peer. Therefore, the number of potential matches to be
considered is |Ω|= card(N s) × card(N b), and the objective
of the matching process is to determine power transfer pω
between peers given in trade set Ω. On the other hand in the
peer-centric configuration that allows peers to negotiate trade
prices, all trades have standard size pω =P and there can be
multiple trades between a buyer and a seller to satisfy their
needs. Therefore, the peer-centric configuration is represented
as a bipartite graph with multiple parallel edges in Fig. 2(b),
where edges ω1, ω2, ω3 denote multiple trades of the standard
size). The number of parallel edges between seller n and
buyer m is calculated as min{Gpn/P,D
p
m/P} where G
p
n and
D
p
m are the generation capacity of seller n and the maximum
demand of buyer m. Then the number of potential matches to
be considered is |Ω|=∑n∈N s,m∈Nb min{Gpn/P,Dpm/P}.
1) System-centric configuration: The system-centric con-
figuration is modeled as follows:
max
ΞP2P
OP2P :=
( ∑
n∈Nb
Un(d
p
n)−
∑
n∈N s
Cn(g
p
n)
)
(4a)
Gpn ≤ gpn ≤ G
p
n, ∀n ∈ N s, (4b)
Dpn ≤ dpn ≤ D
p
n, ∀n ∈ N b, (4c)
gpn =
∑
ω∈Ωn
pω, ∀n ∈ N s, (4d)
dpn =
∑
ω∈Ωn
pω, ∀n ∈ N b, (4e)
pω ≥ 0 ∀ω ∈ Ω, (4f)
where ΞP2P = {gpn, dpn, pω,≥ 0}. The objective function in
Eq. (4a) optimizes the welfare of all peers by maximizing the
difference between the utility functions of consumers (Un)
and cost functions of producers (Cn). Eq. (4b) imposes
limits on the power that can be sold based on the physical
limits of producer n ∈ N s. Similarly, Eq. (4c) establishes the
minimum and maximum limits on the power purchased by
buyer n ∈ N b. Note that Eq. (4c) models elastic consumers
that can adjust their consumption based on their utility func-
tion. However, if the consumers are inelastic, Eq. (4c) can
be converted into an equality by setting Dpn = D
p
n. Eq. (4d)
sets the total power sold by producer n ∈ N s and Eq. (4e)
computes the total power received by consumer n ∈ N b from
all producers, where Ωn defines the trade set for peer n:
Ωn =
{
{ω ∈ Ω|s(ω) = n}, if n ∈ N s,
{ω ∈ Ω|b(ω) = n}, if n ∈ N b. (5)
Eq. (4f) sets the power transfer from a seller to a buyer to non-
negative values. The outcome of the optimization in Eq. (4)
yields set of optimal matches Ω∗. The system-centric optimiza-
tion in Eq. (4) pursues the system-wide welfare-maximization
at the expense of sacrificing preferences of individual peers
(e.g. cost minimization for consumers or profit maximization
for producers) that may act strategically in order to increase
their individual welfare. Therefore, the optimization in Eq. (4)
reminisces wholesale pool electricity markets.
2) Peer-centric configuration: Unlike the system-centric
optimization in Eq. (4), the peer-centric configuration matches
the peers with respect to preferences of individual peers. This
process is decentralized and, therefore, can be carried out
independently from the utility. As a result, each peer has the
capability to negotiate, accept and reject trade ω based on
their preferences, including bounded rationality and privacy
considerations [25], [26]. The objective of the negotiation
5process is to establish a stable match between producers and
consumers, i.e. there is no incentive to deviate from the cleared
transactions unless the availability of producers or demand of
consumers change. To obtain a stable match, we leverage the
recent result by Morstyn et al. [8] that exploits the concept of
full substitutability [11], which ensures that a decentralized
price-adjustment process can be performed based on local
information available to the peers and only requires com-
munication between the peers engaged in trade ω. Since the
peer-centric configuration requires no central coordinator (e.g.
the utility in the system-centric configuration), it does not
necessarily achieve a welfare-maximizing solution.
The stable match for each peer can be obtained as, [8]:
Ω∗n=
{
arg maxΩn
{∑
ω∈Ωnρ
s
ωpω−Cn(gpn)
}
, ∀n∈N s,
arg maxΩn
{
Un(d
p
n)−
∑
ω∈Ωn ρ
b
ωpω
}
, ∀n∈N b, (6a)
where:
Un(d
p
n)=
{
Υn(d
p
n −Dpn), if dpn ≥ Dpn
−∞, otherwise , ∀n ∈ N
b, (6b)
gpn =
∑
ω∈Ωn
pω, ∀n ∈ N s, (6c)
dpn =
∑
ω∈Ωn
pω, ∀n ∈ N b. (6d)
Eq. (6a) is the objective function of buying/selling peer n that
aims to select those trades Ω∗n ⊆ Ω which are optimal with
respect to their preferences, where ρbω and ρ
s
ω are the buying
and selling prices of trade ω. Eq. (6b) is the utility function of
consumer n that factors in the elasticity of consumers and their
willingness to adjust their consumption. This utility function
can be modified to reflect various preferences of peers on
trades. The total power generation and demand of peer n are
calculated in Eq. (6c) and (6d) as the sum of traded power pω
over transactions ω ∈ Ωn.
Based on the policy in Eq. (6), the stable match among all
peers is achieved using the price adjustment process given
in Algorithm 1, which is an iterative procedure that seeks
consensus among all peers [8]. First, the buyer and the seller
prices are initialized at zero for all trades in set Ω, and saved
in set of trade prices Λω . At the beginning of each iteration,
trade price set Λω is saved as Λoldω and each peer construct
their preferred trade set Ω∗n by solving Eq. (6). Then for all
trades that accepted by buyers but rejected by sellers, price
ρsω or ρ
b
ω is adjusted by value ∆ρ. If trade ω is selected by
both seller s(ω) and buyer b(ω), then the current price is set
as trade price (ρω=ρsω=ρ
b
ω). The adjustment process repeats
until prices for all trades converge. Once all trades are settled,
the collection of such trades is returned as set Ω∗.
B. Network usage charges
Although the peer-matching configurations presented in
Section III-A stably generate the set of selected trades Ω∗, the
matching outcomes are not guaranteed to comply with distri-
bution network limits and, therefore, it may lead to overloading
the distribution system assets. To avoid this overloading, the
peer-matching process must consider network constraints. This
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that relate the P2P interactions and the operating conditions
in the distribution network. To derive these network usage
charges, we use DLMPs with the intent to incentivize those
P2P transactions that facilitate distribution network operations
and penalize those P2P transactions that are unfavorable from
the network operation perspective.
We derive the network usage charges using the second-
order-cone AC OPF model, [25], that scales well for large
networks and makes it possible to derive DLMP components
accounting for energy demand, line congestion, nodal volt-
age, and power losses. Accordingly, the distribution network
operations from the utility perspective can be modeled as:
max
⌅Dist
ODist :=
X
b2B
⇥
TbD
p
b (1   b)  Cupgb
⇤  Cwpg0 (7a)
( b) : f
p
l|s(l)=b 
X
l|r(l)=b
(fpl  alRl)  pgb   gpn=b+Dpb
+Gbvb =0, 8b2B,
(7b)
(µb) : f
q
l|s(l)=b 
X
l|r(l)=b
(fql alXl)  qgb+Dqb
 Bbvb =0, 8b2B,
(7c)
(⌘+l ) : (f
p
l )
2
+(fql )
2S2l , 8l2L, (7d)
(⌘ l ) : (f
p
l  alRl)2+(fql alXl)2S2l , 8l2L, (7e)
vo(l) 2(Rlfpl +Xlfql ) + al
 
R2l +X
2
l
 
=vr(l), 8l2L, (7f)
(fpl )
2
+ (fql )
2
al
 vo(l), 8l2L, (7g)
P gb  pgb  P
g
b , 8b 2 B, (7h)
Qg
b
 qgb  Q
g
b , 8b 2 B, (7i)
V b  vb  V b, 8b2B. (7j)
where ⌅Dist = {fpl , fql , pgb , gpn, al, vb   0} . Objective func-
tion ODist in Eq. (7a) maximizes the profit of the utility
given tariff Tb and the amount of load served by the utility
(1   b)Dpb minus the cost of utility operated generators Cupgb
and the cost of purchasing power pg0 from the wholesale market
at price Cw. Note that pg0 = 0 fp0 , i.e. all the power purchased
in the wholesale market is injected via the root node of the
distribution network. The active and reactive power balance
are enforced in Eq. (7b)-(7c). Unlike in the objective function
in Eq. (7a), the demand enforced in Eq. (7b)-(7c) accounts
for the supply from both the P2P platform and utility, i.e. the
resulting DLMPs reflect both components. The apparent power
flow limits on the receiving and sending nodes of each line
are enforced in Eq. (7d)-(7e). Eq. (7f) relates the line flows
and nodal voltages, while Eq. (7g) is the second-order conic
constraint that convexifies the original non-convex AC OPF
problem, [25]. The active and reactive power output limits on
utility generators are enforced in Eq. (7h) and (7i). Eq. (7j)
limits nodal voltage magnitudes.
Given the AC OPF formulation in Eq. (7), the DLMPs can
be computed as follows, [21]:
 o(l) =A1 r(l)+A2µo(l)+A3µr(l)+A4⌘
+
o(l)+A5⌘
 
o(l), (8)
where parameters A1, · · · , A5 are computed based on the
optimal OPF solution, as described in Appendix. The DLMPs
obtained from Eq. (8) internalizes the effects of binding
constraints in Eq. (7b)-(7e) and can be interpreted in terms of
distribution line losses, power flow limits and nodal voltage
limits, [21]. Given the DLMPs in Eq. (8), we compute the
network usage charge for trade ! between buyer b(!) and
seller s(!) as follows:
cn! = ( b(!)    s(!))/2, 8! 2 ⌦, (9)
where the factor of 2 equally splits the network usage charge
between the seller and buyer. The equal allocation of the
network usage charge is motivated by the assumption that the
seller and buyer equally benefit from the transaction and using
the distribution network. Given the value of cn! for trade ! the
Save the previous prices
Seller’s trade selection
Buyer’s trade selection
Price update
Check for changes in price
Algor ithm 1 Price Adjustment Process [8]
can be accomplished by introducing network usage charges
that relate the P2P interactions and the operating conditions
in the distribution network. To derive these network usage
charges, we use DLMPs with the intent to incentivize those
P2P transactions that facilitate distribution network operations
and penalize those P2P transactions that are unfavorable from
the network operation perspective.
We derive the network usage charges using the second-
order-cone AC OPF model, [27], that scales well for large
networks and makes it possible to derive DLMP components
accounting for energy demand, line congestion, nodal volt-
age, and power losses. Accordingly, the distribution network
operations from the utility perspective can be modeled as:
max
ΞDist
ODist :=
∑
b∈B
[
TbD
p
b (1− Γb)− Cub pgb
]− Cwpg0 (7a)
(λb) : f
p
l|s(l)=b−
∑
l|r(l)=b
(fpl −alRl)− pgb − gpn=b+Dpb
+Gbvb =0, ∀b∈B,
(7b)
(µb) : f
q
l|s(l)=b−
∑
l|r(l)=b
(fql−alXl)− qgb +Dqb
−Bbvb =0, ∀b∈B,
(7c)
(η+l ) : (f
p
l )
2
+(fql )
2≤S2l , ∀l∈L, (7d)
(η−l ) : (f
p
l −alRl)2+(fql−alXl)2≤S2l , ∀l∈L, (7e)
vo(l)−2(Rlfpl +Xlfql ) + al
(
R2l +X
2
l
)
=vr(l), ∀l∈L, (7f)
(fpl )
2
+ (fql )
2
al
≤ vo(l), ∀l∈L, (7g)
P gb ≤ pgb ≤ P
g
b , ∀b ∈ B, (7h)
Qg
b
≤ qgb ≤ Q
g
b , ∀b ∈ B, (7i)
V b ≤ vb ≤ V b, ∀b∈B, (7j)
6where ΞDist = {fpl , fql , pgb , gpn, al, vb ≥ 0}. Objective function
ODist in Eq. (7a) maximizes the profit of the utility given tariff
Tb and the amount of load served by the utility (1− Γb)Dpb
minus the cost of utility operated generators Cub p
g
b and the
cost of purchasing power pg0 from the wholesale market at
price Cw. Note that pg0 = 0− fp0 , i.e. all the power purchased
in the wholesale market is injected via the root node of the
distribution network. The active and reactive power balance
are enforced in Eq. (7b)-(7c). Unlike in the objective function
in Eq. (7a), the demand enforced in Eq. (7b)-(7c) accounts
for the supply from both the P2P platform and utility, i.e.
the resulting DLMPs reflect both components. The apparent
power flow limits on the receiving and sending nodes of each
line are enforced in Eq. (7d)-(7e). Eq. (7f) relates the line
flows and nodal voltages, while Eq. (7g) is the second-order
conic constraint that convexifies the original non-convex AC
OPF problem, [27]. This convexification is proven to be exact
for distribution systems with a radial topology under rather
unrestrictive assumptions (see [28] for details). However, in
the case of meshed distribution topologies, the second-order
conic relaxation holds only under the restrictive assumption
of phase shifters placed in strategic locations, [28]. If this
assumption does not hold, other AC power flow formulations
(e.g. LinDistFlow [29]) can be used in the proposed modeling
framework. The active and reactive power output limits on
utility generators are enforced in Eq. (7h) and (7i). Eq. (7j)
limits nodal voltage magnitudes.
Given the AC OPF formulation in Eq. (7), the DLMPs can
be computed as follows, [21]:
λo(l) =A1λr(l)+A2µo(l)+A3µr(l)+A4η
+
o(l)+A5η
−
o(l), (8)
where parameters A1, · · · , A5 are computed based on the
optimal OPF solution, as described in Appendix. The DLMPs
obtained from Eq. (8) internalizes the effects of binding
constraints in Eq. (7b)-(7e) and can be interpreted in terms of
distribution line losses, power flow limits and nodal voltage
limits, [21]. Given the DLMPs in Eq. (8), we compute the
network usage charge for trade ω between buyer b(ω) and
seller s(ω) as follows:
cnω = (λb(ω) − λs(ω))/2, ∀ω ∈ Ω, (9)
where the factor of 2 equally splits the network usage charge
between the seller and buyer. The equal allocation of the
network usage charge is motivated by the assumption that
the seller and buyer equally benefit from the transaction and
using the distribution network. As the value of cnω is based
on DLMPs, it reflects the network conditions and can be used
to incentivize P2P trades that improve system conditions, and
penalize, if otherwise. Given the value of cnω for trade ω the
buyer pays ρω + cnω and the seller receives the payment of
ρω − cnω . Hence, the total network usage charges collected by
the utility can be computed as:
NUC(cnω, pω) :=
∑
ω∈Ω∗
2cnωpω, (10)
where
∑
ω∈Ω∗ pω =
∑
n∈NbD
p
nΓn =
∑
n∈N s g
p
n. Note that
NUC(cnω, pω) in Eq. (10) is the second term in Eq. (2).
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Fig. 3: Coordination between the proposed P2P platform and utility
operations using the network usage charges for the (a) system-centric
configuration and (b) peer-centric configuration. The dashed boxes
delineate P2P- and utility-end procedures.
Since the total network usage charges in Eq. (10) are
computed using DLMPs, which only recover operating costs,
NUC(cnω, pω) may generate insufficient revenues to support
further distribution system expansion, unlike the regulated
tariff discussed in Section II-A. Therefore, to support this
expansion, DLMPs must be extended to include capital costs,
e.g. see the approach in [30].
C. Coordination between the P2P platform and utility
Given the network usage charges, the P2P platform and
utility operations can be coordinated to comply with distribu-
tion network limits. However, this coordination varies for the
system- and peer-centric configurations. Fig. 3 illustrates the
coordination for each configuration as further detailed below.
1) System-centric configuration: Under the system-centric
P2P configuration, the integration between the P2P platform
and utility operations can be achieved by co-optimizing the
P2P- and utility-end decisions. This co-optimization is shown
in Fig. 3(a) and is similar to a pool market design and,
therefore, imposes similar requirements on the data that peers
need to share with the P2P platform (e.g. consumption and
production levels, characteristics of cost and utility functions,
among other preferences). Thus, the P2P platform first collects
this information from peers. Second, given the collected infor-
mation, the co-optimization of the P2P transaction and utility-
operated distribution assets matches the peers and dispatches
them to maximize the social welfare and meet distribution
network constraints. This co-optimization is formulated as:
max OP2P +ODist (11a)
Eq. (4b)–(4f) P2P constraints (11b)
Eq. (7b)–(7j) Network constraints (11c)
7Third, once the co-optimization in Eq. (11) is solved, the
DLMPs can be computed as in Eq. (8). Finally, given the
DLMPs, the P2P platform computes the network usage charges
as in Eq. (9), and settles the transactions among the peers.
2) Peer-centric configuration: Since the peer-centric coor-
dination assumes that the P2P platform and the utility are
operated separately, the coordination is achieved under the
iterative procedure displayed in Fig. 3(b). First, the P2P
platform generates set of potential trades Ω. Second, the P2P
platform matches the peers, i.e. it computes set of selected
trades Ω∗ and the corresponding price for each trade ρω using
Algorithm 1. Next, the utility solves an OPF problem in Eq. (7)
given the nodal injections for trades in set Ω∗ transmitted
from the P2P platform. Since the trades in set Ω∗ are myopic
to network limits, solving Eq. (7) may lead to a suboptimal
or infeasible solution. To avoid such outcomes, the utility
imposes small penalty , if the OPF is infeasible, and the
network usage charges are computed as:
cnω =
{
(λb(ω)−λs(ω))/2, ∀ω ∈ Ω∗, if OPF = feasible
, ∀ω ∈ Ω∗, if OPF = infeasible (12)
Given the updated value of cnω and trade price ρω , the cost and
utility functions of peers in Eq. (6) is updated as follows:
Ω∗n=
{
arg maxΩn
{∑
ω∈Ωn(ρ
s
ω−cnω)pω−Cn(gpn)
}
, ∀n ∈ N s
arg maxΩn
{
Un(d
p
n)−
∑
ω∈Ωn(ρ
b
ω+c
n
ω)pω
}
, ∀n ∈ N b
(13)
With the updated cost and utility functions, the iterative
procedure in Fig. 3(b) continues until the stable peer match
is found. Relative to the system-centric configuration, the
iterative procedure allows for accommodating the negotiation
process among the peers and prevents from sharing the infor-
mation about individual peers with the utility.
IV. CASE STUDY
The case study uses the 15-bus distribution system from
[21] and the realistic, urban-scale 141-bus distribution feeder
from [31]. All models are implemented using the Julia JuMP
package and the code and input data are available in [32].
A. 15-bus distribution test system
The distribution system illustrated in Fig. 4 has two pro-
ducers located at node 1 and 12 with the installed capacity of
2MW and 0.4MW and the incremental cost of $50/MWh and
$10/MWh, respectively. The total load in the system is 1.63
MW. We select Γb = 100%,∀b ∈ B, i.e. the utility does not
supply electricity and only operates the distribution network.
Fig. 5 compares the P2P interactions under the system- and
peer-centric configurations. While the two producing peers sell
TABLE I. PEER PAYMENTS AND NETWORK USAGE CHARGES
Configuration
Payments Revenues
NUC, Cost ofof consumers, of producers, ∑
ω 2c
n
ωpω
generation,∑
ω(ρω+c
n
ω)pω
∑
ω(ρω−cnω)pω
∑
ω Cn(g
p
n)
System-centric $88.20 $78.17 $10.03 $70.61
Peer-centric $79.46 $79.01 $0.45 $71.80
roughly the same capacity under both configurations, the sold
power capacity is differently allocated among consumers. The
peer-centric configuration tends to favor transactions among
neighboring buses, i.e. producer at node 1 sells exclusively
to the nodes 2 and 13 that are directly adjacent to it. On the
other hand, the system-centric configuration results in a more
diverse set of the P2P interactions that allows the transactions
among electrically remote nodes.
As a result of this different trade allocation, the two P2P
configurations lead to different utilization of the distribution
network and, therefore, to different network usage charges.
Fig. 6 compares line loading and nodal voltage magnitudes un-
der the two configurations. Since the peer-centric configuration
favors transactions among neighboring nodes, it does not fully
utilize line capacity and incurs lower network usage charges
for the peers as shown in Fig. 5. For example, As a result,
the peer-centric configuration does not maximize the social
welfare of the entire distribution network. On the other hand,
the welfare maximum is achieved under the system-centric
configuration, where the P2P transactions are explicitly co-
optimized with distribution network operations, which leads
to a higher utilization of line capacity (Fig. 6) and greater
network usage charges in total (Fig. 5). Since network usage
charges represent the system conditions resulting from the
settled trades, they can attain both positive and negative values.
For example, some trades in Fig. 5 have negative network
usage charges, which implies that such trades would relieve
line congestion or improve a nodal voltage profile. Purchasing
electricity from peer 1 with the incremental cost of $50/MWh
would be more expensive than peer 12 with the incremental
cost of $10/MWh, but such trades could improve network con-
ditions, and therefore, network usage charges are discounted.
These differences in utilization of the distribution network lead
to different network usage charges and achieve different levels
of social welfare as compared in Table I. Accordingly, the
system-centric configuration results in a greater revenue of the
utility from the network usage charges, while the peer-centric
formulation ensures the least-cost electricity supply.
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Fig. 4: 15-bus radial distribution system from [21] with nodal indices
in circles. Italic numbers above edges represent line indices. Orange
nodes represent producing peers.
TABLE II. LOCATION, INCREMENTAL COST AND CAPACITY OF DGS
Peer 1 30 40 50 60 70 80 101 121
Incremental 20 10 12 11 15 10 17 10 13Cost, $/MWh
Capacity, MW 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
8¢2.004/kWh
¢0.004/kWh
¢1.973/kWh
¢1.922/kWh
¢-0.078/kWh
¢1.929/kWh
¢-0.071/kWh
¢1.933/kWh
¢-0.066/kWh
¢1.939/kWh
¢-0.061/kWh
¢1.893/kWh
¢-0.107/kWh
¢1.887/kWh
¢-0.113/kWh
¢1.877/kWh
¢-0.123/kWh
¢1.848/kWh
¢-0.152/kWh
¢2.003/kWh
¢0.003/kWh
¢2.023/kWh
¢2.035/kWh
¢0.035/kWh
¢0.123/kWh
¢0.004/kWh
¢0.103/kWh
¢0.072/kWh
¢0.078/kWh
¢0.083/kWh
¢0.088/kWh
¢0.050/kWh
¢0.044/kWh
¢0.035/kWh
¢0.011/kWh
¢0.003/kWh
¢0.142/kWh
¢0.153/kWh
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Fig. 5: P2P transactions in 15-bus distribution system under the (a)
system-centric and (b) peer-centric configurations. Blue and orange
colors represent the trades by producing peers 1 and 12. The network
usage charge cnω is given next to each consuming peers b(ω). Note
that there is no producer or consumer at bus 3.
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Fig. 6: (a) Distribution line loading (in % relative to Sl) and (b) nodal
voltage magnitudes under the system- and peer-centric configurations.
B. 141-bus urban-scale distribution feeder
We add 9 DERs with parameters given in Table II to the
141-bus distribution system from [31], which has the total load
of 11.98MW. Different penetration levels of P2P transactions
are simulated by varying parameter Γb between 0 and 0.6,
while assuming that the utility must operate the distribution
network and supply the residual demand. Fig. 7 compares the
line loading and voltage magnitudes under the two P2P config-
urations. As the P2P penetration level increases in both cases,
the line loading and its variance across lines monotonically
reduce. This reduction is mainly achieved due to the fact that
the P2P interactions offset centralized electricity production
by local power injections. Similarly, local power injections
improve a voltage profile across the distribution network due to
the reduction of power losses. As a result, the P2P interactions
under both configurations lead to sizable reductions in the
magnitude and volatility of DLMPs as the P2P penetration
level increases, as shown in Fig. 8. The difference in DLMPs
under the system- and peer-centric configurations merely exists
and further reduces as the P2P platform penetration level
increases.
Table III compares average network usage charge E(cnω)=∑
ω∈Ω∗ c
n
ωpω/
∑
ω∈Ω∗ pω of the system- and peer-centric con-
figurations with different P2P platform participation levels Γb
and corresponding P2P supplied demand
∑
b∈B ΓbD
p
b . The
system-centric yields higher network usage charges, because
it tends to spread the use of P2P resources across the entire
distribution network, which maximizes the global welfare. On
the other hand, the peer-centric configuration results in lower
and, even negative in some cases, network usage charges, be-
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Fig. 7: Comparison of line loading (in % relative to Sl) and
voltage magnitudes under the (a) system-centric and (b) peer-centric
configurations. The red line within the blue box represents the median
value, the bottom and top edges of the box represent the first and third
quartiles and the outliers are plotted outside the box in red.
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Fig. 8: (a) DLMPs of the system-centric configuration and (b)
the difference of DLMPs between the system- and peer-centric
configurations (∆λb=λSCb −λPCb ) with Γb=Γ.
TABLE III. AVERAGE NETWORK USAGE CHARGES
P2P supplied Γb 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
Demand
∑
bΓbD
p
b 0 1.20 2.40 3.59 4.79 5.99 7.19
E(cnω), $/MWh
System 0 0.65 0.84 0.84 0.93 0.94 0.93
Peer 0 -0.09 -0.07 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 0.03
cause it favors network-friendly P2P trades without accounting
for the welfare-maximization.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper describes a new distribution grid architecture
with a P2P platform enabling trades among small-scale DERs.
The proposed P2P platform can internalize both of the system-
and peer-centric matching processes. The system-centric con-
figuration achieves a centralized peer matching in a welfare-
maximizing manner and the peer-centric configuration allows
peers to reflect their preferences and match in a decentralized
way. For both configurations, we use DLMPs to coordinate the
distribution system operation and the P2P energy trading and
to design network usage charges that peers pay for using the
distribution network operated by the utility. Our simulations
analyze techno-economic performance of the P2P platform
from the perspective of the utility and peers.
The results presented in this paper point to multiple di-
rections for our future work. First, it is important to extend
the proposed P2P architecture to account for dynamically
changing utility and cost functions of peers, as well as their
ability to observe and collect additional information about
the distribution system and other peers. This information, in
turn, can be used by peers strategically to advance their self-
interest at the expense of other P2P participants, which should
be mitigated. Second, it is important to internalize various
demand- and supply-side uncertainties to include their effects
on peer matching and network usage charges. Third, the AC
power flow model can be extended to accommodate meshed
distribution system typologies. Furthermore, the power flow
model can be extended to compute network usage charges
in the presence of three-phase, unbalanced operating condi-
tions, which often occur in low-voltage distribution systems.
Finally, since the proposed P2P architecture changes operating
principles, long-term planning methods should be modified
accordingly. In particular, these methods must account for
decentralized decision-making processes executed by peers
and internalize the capital cost of system expansion in network
usage charges.
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APPENDIX
As derived in [21], the DLMPs are computed for the origin
node o(l) of line l as follows:
λo(l) =A1λr(l)+A2µo(l)+A3µr(l)+A4η
+
o(l)+A5η
−
o(l), (14a)
where µo(l), µr(l), η
+
o(l) and η
−
o(l) are the dual variables of the
optimization in Eq. (7) and parameters A1, A2, A3, A4, A5
denote the following functional expressions:
A1 =
((fpl )
2+(fql )
2)Xl+alf
q
l (R
2
l −X2l )−2alfpl RlXl
((fpl )
2 + (fql )
2)Xl − alfql (R2l +X2l )
(14b)
A2 =
((fpl )
2 + (fql )
2)Rl − alfpl (R2l +X2l )
((fpl )
2 + (fql )
2)Xl − alfql (R2l +X2l )
(14c)
A3 =
−((fpl )2+(fql )2)Rl+alfpl (R2l −X2l )+2alfql RlXl
((fpl )
2+ (fql )
2)Xl − alfql (R2l +X2l )
(14d)
A4 =
2((fql )
3Rl − (fpl )3Xl) + 2fpl fql (fpl Rl − fql Xl)
((fpl )
2 + (fql )
2)Xl − alfql (R2l +X2l )
(14e)
A5 =
2((fql )
3Rl − 2(fpl )3Xl) + 2fpl fql (fpl Rl − fql Xl)
((fpl )
2 + (fql )
2)Xl − alfql (R2l +X2l )
+
2a2l (f
q
l R
3
l − fpl X3l )− 4alfpl fql (R2l −X2l )
((fpl )
2 + (fql )
2)Xl − alfql (R2l +X2l )
+
4alRlXl((f
p
l )
2 − (fql )2)
((fpl )
2 + (fql )
2)Xl − alfql (R2l +X2l )
+
−2a2lRlXl(fpl Rl − fql Xl)
((fpl )
2 + (fql )
2)Xl − alfql (R2l +X2l )
(14f)
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